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This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze 
the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts 
are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing 
participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy 
outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy 
organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those 
segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the 
ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting 
gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and 
decreasing in the segment’s size. 
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Part of this work was completed while Kovenock was Visiting Professor at the Social Science 
Research Center Berlin (WZB). 1 Introduction
The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 not only establishes guidelines for governmen-
tal agencies, but also specically encourages nongovernmental entities to take an active role
in voter registration. There is a myriad of nonprot organizations | such as the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), Declare Yourself, the League
of Women Voters, and Rock the Vote to name a few | actively engaged in this eort.
However, the tax-exempt status of these nonprot organizations requires that any get-out-
the-vote eorts (henceforth, gotv) be nonpartisan. A natural question that arises is: how do
nonpartisan gotv eorts inuence policy outcomes?
Although there is extensive research on the eectiveness of the various gotv methods,1 the
theoretical research on how nonpartisan gotv eorts inuence policy outcomes is scant.2 This
is especially true when contrasted to the voluminous research on related political inuence
activities such as lobbying. One reason for this neglect may be the fact that nonpartisan gotv
eorts often claim lofty goals such as promoting democracy.3 However, the most engaged
nonprot organizations are inherently political and are typically attached to a particular
segment of the electorate. And, in contrast to encouraging broad participation in govern-
ment, nonpartisan groups may legally target their gotv eorts in a way that promotes their
political objectives.4
To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv eorts inuence policy outcomes we utilize
1See Green and Gerber (2008) for a survey of this research.
2An exception to this is in the sociology literature following Marwell (2004), which considers the role of
nonprot organizations in machine politics.
3This may also partly be due to the fact that in the two-party Hotelling-Downs model voter abstention
[as rst discussed by Downs 1957 (who uses the term `rational' non-voting) and by Converse 1966 (who
uses the term `dynamic' non-voting)] does not alter the policy choices of oce-seeking candidates. See for
example Hinich and Ordeshook (1969), Ledyard (1984), and Riker and Ordeshook (1973).
4According to IRS rules for 501(c)(3)s, nonpartisan gotv eorts may be targeted at groups that are either
under represented or that broadly share a set of common interests. For further details see the April 17, 2008
IRS memo which describes the Political Activities Compliance Initiative for the 2008 political campaign
season (available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2008 paci program letter.pdf).
1a three-period model of redistributive politics with segmented voters.5 The electorate con-
sists of a nite number of disjoint segments, which may dier in size. In each segment an
exogenously specied portion (possibly zero) of the citizens abstains from voting, and the
abstention rates (or conversely, voter turnout rates) may vary across segments. Each voter
prefers higher to lower transfers, and each segment has a nonprot advocacy organization
that represents its interests. In period one, each nonprot may increase the voter turnout
rate in its segment by investing in nonpartisan gotv eorts that target the citizens in its seg-
ment. In period two, the two expected vote-share maximizing political parties observe the
segments' updated turnout rates, and announce budget-balanced redistributive schedules,
which consist of an intra-segment homogeneous transfer level for each segment.6 In period
three, each of the voters votes for the party that oers the higher transfer.
In equilibrium, only a subset of the nonprot organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
eorts with the gotv eorts occurring only in those segments of the electorate which are
suciently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante abstention rate). In the
segments in which nonpartisan gotv eorts arise, the change in the voter turnout rate, as
a result of the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eorts, is increasing in the segment's level of
disenfranchisement and is decreasing in the segment's size. The increases in the voter turnout
rates in the smaller more disenfranchised segments lead the parties to place relatively greater
weight on those segments, which results in higher equilibrium expected transfers to those
segments. Conversely, the segments that are larger and more civically engaged (i.e., have
lower ex ante abstention rates) receive lower expected transfers.
5Our model builds on the redistributive politics literature with segmented voters. See for example Cox
and McCubbins (1986), Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), Laslier (2002),
Str omberg (2004), Schultz (2007), Kovenock and Roberson (2008, 2009), and Roberson (2008) among others.
6This may, alternatively, be interpreted as a level of local public good provision under the following
assumptions: (1) each citizen has the same preferences for local public good provision, (2) these preferences
are linear with respect to the level of local public good provision, (3) there are constant returns to the
production of the local public goods, and (4) there are no externalities or spillovers from local public good
provision.
2The intuition for the equilibrium pattern of nonpartisan gotv eorts and the resulting
impact on policy outcomes follows from the interaction of size and disenfranchisement eects.
The nonprot advocacy organizations optimally engage in nonpartisan gotv eorts in order
to maximize their respective segment's equilibrium expected transfer | which is strictly
increasing in the segment's turnout rate | net of the cost of their nonpartisan gotv eorts.
Since each segment's equilibrium expected transfer depends on the segment's turnout rate,
the nonprot advocacy groups in the smaller segments have a size advantage. To increase a
segment's turnout rate by any given percentage the number of initially non-voting citizens
who must become voting citizens and, hence, the cost of the nonpartisan gotv eorts needed
to induce this change, is increasing in the size of the segment. For example consider two
segments (A and B), each with a turnout rate of 50%, but in segment A there are 4 citizens (2
voters and 2 non-voters) while in segment B there are 8 citizens (4 voters and 4 non-voters).
In order to increase the turnout rate to 75%, segment A needs only one non-voting citizen to
become a voter, but segment B needs two additional voters. To summarize, the smaller the
segment the larger the marginal eect that each initially non-voting citizen who, through
nonpartisan gotv eorts, switches and becomes a voting citizen has on the turnout rate.
In addition to the size eect, in the more disenfranchised segments increasing the turnout
rate by any given percentage requires that a lower proportion of initially non-voting citizens
become voters as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eorts. If the marginal return to nonpar-
tisan gotv eorts is increasing with respect to the proportion of non-voting citizens, then
the nonprot advocacy groups also encounter a voter disenfranchisement eect. Combining
the size and disenfranchisement eects, it follows that the nonprot advocacy organizations
in the smaller more disenfranchised segments can more readily increase their turnout rates
and that, as a result, these segments benet the most from the resulting changes in the
equilibrium expected transfers.
Our results indicate that nonpartisan gotv eorts have a meaningful impact on the policy
3choices of oce-seeking parties, and | in addition to broadly encouraging civic engagement
| are an important political inuence tool for nonprot advocacy groups. The competition
between nonprot organizations through nonpartisan gotv eorts is a heretofore unexplored
form of special interest politics in which the advocacy eorts are constrained by the regula-
tions on nonprot organizations. In spite of these constraints, our results are reminiscent of
issues that arise in the literature on the combination of lobbying or campaign contributions
and electoral competition (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1987, Baron 1994, Besley and
Coate 2001, and Grossman and Helpman 1996, 2001). In this setting as in ours, special
interest groups simultaneously and non-cooperatively compete in order to inuence the out-
come of the election and the resulting policies. However, in our setting this competition is
over voter turnout and the indirect eect that this has, through the relative weights that
the political parties place on the segments, on the election and the resulting policies. Our
analysis, thus, extends the literature on special interest politics to allow for nonprot ad-
vocacy groups who use targeted nonpartisan gotv eorts and demonstrates the impact that
such eorts have on policy outcomes.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the multistage model of redistributive
politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv eorts. Section 3 characterizes the subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies in the model and examines the nature of the equilibrium transfers
by the parties and the equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eorts by the nonprot organizations.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
To examine how targeted nonpartisan gotv eorts inuence policy outcomes we utilize a
three-period model of redistributive politics. In the rst (or nonpartisan gotv) stage, each
nonprot organization in each segment of the electorate simultaneously chooses a level of
4investment in targeted nonpartisan gotv eort. Within each segment, the targeted nonpar-
tisan gotv eorts increase the turnout rate in that segment. In the second (or campaign)
stage, the two political parties observe the segments' updated turnout rates, and each party
simultaneously announces a transfer schedule. In the nal (or voting) stage, each voter in
each segment observes the proposed transfer from each party and votes for the party that
oers the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization).
The initial conditions of the game are given as follows. The electorate consists of a nite
number nc of citizens. Each citizen belongs to one of the nite number ns of identiable and
disjoint segments indexed by j 2 f1;:::;nsg. The number of citizens in segment j is denoted
mj, so that
Pns
j=1 mj = nc. The segments of citizens may be distinguished by characteristics,
such as race, gender, age, socioeconomic factors, geographic location, etc.
Citizens may either be voters or non-voters. Within each segment of citizens, a proportion
of the citizens abstains from voting in period three.7 While we abstract from the exact cause
of voter abstention, this may be thought of as arising from considerations such as costly
voting. Let v0
j 2 (0;1) denote the initial proportion of the citizens in segment j who turn
out and vote in the election (henceforth, the turnout rate). Alternatively, 1 v0
j is the initial
proportion of the citizens in segment j who abstain from voting (henceforth, the abstention
rate), and the initial number of non-voters in segment j is (1 v0
j)mj. Observe that segment
j is distinguished by both its number of citizens mj and its initial turnout rate v0
j. Moreover,





7In assuming a deterministic and nite number of voters in each segment we are ignoring integer problems
that arise when the turnout and abstention rates generate non-whole numbers of citizens who intend to vote
or abstain. This integer problem can be avoided without diculty in a number of ways. First, one can
assume, when necessary, the existence of a marginal citizen in the segment that is endowed with a fractional
vote rather than a full vote Alternatively, one can assume that the actual number of citizens voting within a
segment is stochastic, but whole, but that the expected turnout and abstention rates generate mathematical
expectations that are potentially non-whole. Finally, we can assume the number of citizens in each segment
is large and that our continuous treatment is viewed as an arbitrarily close approximation. In fact, our
analysis would not be altered substantially if we assumed that each of the nite number of segments contains
a continuum of citizens.
5Let the three-stage game with segment sizes m = (m1;:::;mns) and initial turnout rates
v0 = (v0
1;:::;v0
ns) be denoted  (m;v0). We start the description of the model in the nal
stage.
Voting Stage
Suppose that as a result of nonpartisan gotv eorts in the rst stage the voter turnout
rate in each of the segments in the nal voting stage is updated from v0 = (v0
1;:::;v0
ns) to
v = (v1;:::;vns). Moreover, let ti;j denote the transfer promised to each citizen in segment
j by party i 2 fA;Bg in the second stage of the game. We assume that all citizens prefer
higher to lower transfers and in the nal stage each citizen that is a voter votes for the party
that provides the higher transfer (with ties broken by fair randomization). Hence, if party i
provides a strictly higher transfer to segment j than its rival party, it earns the votes of the
mjvj voters in that segment, with mj(1   vj) citizens abstaining from voting.
Campaign Stage
The second stage consists of a redistributive politics model which extends Laslier (2002)
and Laslier and Picard (2002) to allow for voter abstention. At the start of period two, the
two expected vote-share maximizing political parties, denoted by i 2 fA;Bg, observe the
segments' updated turnout rates v = (v1;:::;vns) and make binding promises as to how
they would allocate a xed budget across the electorate. The xed budget is normalized to
one unit of the homogeneous good. The parties may target campaign promises of dierent
transfers to dierent segments, but within each segment of citizens, each citizen receives the
same transfer. We assume that ti;j, the transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by
party i, must be nonnegative. For each party, the set of feasible ns-tuples of transfers across












As in Laslier (2002), if a single segment of the electorate contains a majority of the voters,
then the unique equilibrium is in pure strategies, in which both of the parties oer the entire
budget to the segment with the majority of voters. If no single segment contains a majority
of voters, then there are no pure-strategy equilibria in the campaign stage. For each party
i 2 fA;Bg a mixed strategy, which we label a transfer schedule, is an ns-variate distribution
function Pi : R
ns
+ ! [0;1] with support, denoted Supp(Pi), contained in the set of feasible
transfers, T , and with the set of univariate marginal distribution functions fFi;jg
ns
j=1, one
univariate marginal distribution function for each segment of the electorate. The ns-tuple of
party i's transfer of resources across the ns segments is a random ns-tuple drawn from the
ns-variate distribution Pi. Recall that the elements of this random ns-tuple represent the
transfer promised to each citizen in segment j by party i, for j = 1;:::;ns.
In order to rule out the possibility that the game is initially or becomes degenerate, we
assume that no single segment is too large in the sense that if all of the segment's citizens
were to turn out and vote the segment would not contain a majority of the voters.







A direct consequence of Assumption 1 is that neither before nor after the nonpartisan
gotv eorts does a single segment contain a majority of the voters.
As is common in the literature on electoral competition, we assume that the implemented
policy is a probabilistic compromise of the parties' oered transfers, which takes on party
A's ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party A's vote share and takes on party
7B's ns-tuple of transfers with probability equal to party B's vote share. Let E(tj) denote
the expected transfer received by each citizen in segment j from the implemented policy
generated by the two parties' transfer schedules.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
In each segment j 2 f1;:::;nsg, there is a nonprot advocacy organization, denoted by
NPj, which represents the segment's interests. In the rst stage, each of the nonprots
has the opportunity to make an investment in nonpartisan gotv eorts. The nonpartisan
gotv technology works as follows. The nonprot organization in segment j chooses a target
rate xj 2 [0;1], which represents the proportion of initially non-voting citizens that, as
a result of the nonpartisan gotv eorts, become voters. For example, nonpartisan gotv
eorts may provide information about voter registration, the location of polling stations, or
other information which lowers the cost of voting, and, thereby, increase the turnout rate.
Alternatively, the nonpartisan gotv eorts may serve to increase the value of the process
benets accruing from the expressive act of voting. In either case, if the nonprot chooses
a target rate of xj for the nonpartisan gotv eort, then the proportion of voting citizens
increases by (1   v0
j)xj. That is, the turnout rate changes from its initial value v0
j to the
updated value vj(xj) as follows
vj(xj)  v
0
j + (1   v
0
j)xj: (1)
After the nonpartisan gotv stage, segment j's share of the voters is mjvj(xj)=
Pns
h=1 mhvh(xh),
which relative to segment j's initial share of the voters may either increase or decrease
depending upon the actions of the nonprot organizations in the other ns   1 segments.
Each nonprot advocacy organization's objective function is assumed to be linearly sep-
arable in the costs and benets of gotv eort. By choosing a target rate of xj 2 [0;1] for the
8nonpartisan gotv eort, the nonprot organization incurs a cost of xjc(mj;v0
j), where the
constant marginal cost c(mj;v0
j) satises the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The constant marginal cost of nonpartisan gotv eort is given by
c(mj;v
0
j) = mj(1   v
0
j)




A constant marginal cost of the form given in Assumption 2 corresponds to a constant
unit cost per new voter equal to . That is, increasing the number of voters in segment
j by mj(1   v0
j)xj entails a total cost of xjc(mj;v0
j) = mj(1   v0
j)xj, and the resulting
constant unit cost per voter is (mj(1 v0
j)xj)=(mj(1 v0
j)xj) = . While this is a stylistic
assumption, this choice of cost structure is motivated as follows. Given the high level of
information that is available to nonprot organizations and the high degree of targetability in
the standard gotv methods (direct mail, phone banks, door-to-door, etc), nonprot advocacy
organizations have the ability to identify the non-voting citizens and to directly target their
nonpartisan gotv eorts at the non-voters. It, therefore, seems reasonable to assume a
constant unit cost per new voter. However, our main results are qualitatively similar under
the assumption that gotv eorts must be broadly targeted at the entire segment rather than
at just the non-voters.8 Assumption 2's condition on the constant unit cost per new voter
 ( > 1=
Pns
h=1 mhv0
h) rules out the possibility that any nonprot would optimally choose a
target rate that resulted in full participation (xj = 1).
Each of the nonprot advocacy organizations is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the
8It is straightforward to extend Theorem 2 to allow for alternative cost specications. Under the assump-
tion that the constant marginal cost depends on only the number of citizens (an assumption consistent with
either or both imperfect targeting and uncertainty over the identity of non-voters), a slightly stronger form
of Propositions 2 and 3 hold as long as the constant marginal cost function c(mj) is elastic with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment. Note that under Assumption 2 the constant marginal cost is unit
elastic with respect to the segment size and, hence, forms an endpoint of the set of the elastic marginal cost
functions with respect to segment size.
9total expected value of the transfers that its segment receives from the implemented policy
minus the opportunity cost of the funds invested in nonpartisan gotv eorts,







where E(tjjxj;x j) is the expected transfer that each citizen in segment j expects to receive
conditional on the ns-tuple of nonpartisan gotv eorts x. Given the normalized budget of
one unit of the homogenous good, the total value of the transfers that segment j receives
from the implemented policy mjE(tjjxj;x j) is equivalent to, and will henceforth be referred
to as, segment j's expected share of the budget.
3 Results
Since it is individually rational for each voter to vote for the party that oers the higher
transfer (doing so increases the expected transfer from the implemented policy), we start our
analysis in the campaign stage and work our way back through the game tree. The second
stage equilibrium transfer schedules are provided in Theorem 1.
Campaign Stage
Theorem 1. Let v = (v1;:::;vns) denote the turnout rates facing the two parties in a
subgame starting at the campaign stage of the game. A pair of transfer schedules (P 
A;P 
B)
constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium pair of local strategies for the subgame starting at
v if and only if the following two conditions are satised: (1) Supp(P 
i )  T and (2) P 
i




10where 8 j 2 f1;:::;nsg
F 
i;j (t) = t
2vj=
Pns







Moreover, such subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies exist and give an expected payo
to each party of 1=2 of the vote share.
Proof. The existence of a pair of ns-variate distribution functions which satisfy conditions
(1) and (2) of Theorem 1 is provided in the appendix. The proof of the uniqueness of the
equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distribution functions is also given in the appendix.
In the following proof we show that any pair of ns-variate distribution functions which
satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of Theorem 1 form an equilibrium. It is sucient to show
that the expected vote share to each party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than
or equal to 1=2, given that the opposition party uses a joint distribution with the univariate
marginals outlined above and that expends the budget with probability one.
First note that if the ns-tuple of initial turnout rates fv0
jg
ns




j0mj0 for all j], then it is clear that vjmj <
P
j06=j vj0mj0 for all j, and so,
no segment contains a majority of the voters.
Suppose that party A plays an arbitrary budget-balanced mixed strategy  PA with the
set of univariate marginals f  FA;jg
ns
j=1. Note that since  PA is budget-balanced, it follows
that Supp(  PA)  T . Also observe that if party B follows an equilibrium strategy P 
B that




condition (2) outlined above, then Supp(P 




h=1 vhmh)] and the hyperplane T .




















11In equation (3), the denominator of the rst expression,
Pns
j=1 vjmj, denotes the number
of citizens that vote in the election. While each party maximizes their expected vote
share, some of the citizens do not vote in the election, and this subset of citizens is not





B;j(t)d  FA;j(t)), denotes the expected number of voters to whom party A
provides a higher transfer.
Since party B's transfers, drawn from an equilibrium strategy P 





h=1 vhmh)], it is clear that in any optimal strategy party A never
provides transfers outside this ns-box. Inserting the unique set of equilibrium univariate
marginals for party B, fF 
B;jg
ns























In any optimal strategy the budget is spent with probability one, and it follows that it is




0 td  FA;j = 1. Thus, A










   PA;P 
B

= (1=2). This completes the proof that the expected vote share to each
party from any budget-balanced strategy is less than or equal to 1=2, given that the oppo-
sition party is using a joint distribution with the univariate marginals outlined above and
that expends the budget with probability one.
The key feature of both parties' equilibrium transfer schedules, and hence, the imple-
mented policy, is that each segment's expected share of the budget, mjE(tj), is identical to




h). As stated in Proposition 1, this feature of
the equilibrium expected transfers implies that in each segment j, the expected share of the
budget is increasing in its turnout rate vj.
12Proposition 1. In each segment j, the expected share of the budget mjE(tj) is equal to the




h) which is increasing in the turnout rate vj(x
j).
Proposition 1 follows directly from the characterization of the equilibrium transfer sched-
ules given in Theorem 1. Note that since each segment's share of the voters, and hence
expected budget share, is increasing in its turnout rate, each of the nonprot advocacy or-
ganizations has incentive to engage in nonpartisan gotv eorts. However, in each segment,
the share of the voters is also decreasing in the turnout rates of each of the other segments.
In the next section we characterize the optimal nonpartisan gotv eorts and examine the
resulting changes in the segments' voter turnout rates and expected budget shares.
Nonpartisan gotv Stage
We now solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium local strategies in the nonpartisan
gotv stage. Recall that in each segment j, if the nonprot advocacy organization chooses
a target rate of xj 2 [0;1] for the nonpartisan gotv eorts, then the updated turnout rate
in segment j, given in equation (1), is vj(xj) = v0
j + (1   v0
j)xj, and the nonprot incurs a
cost of xjc(mj;v0
j). The nonprot seeks to maximize its expected payo, given in equation
(2), by choosing a target rate for reducing voter abstention. Given the equilibrium expected
budget shares (see Proposition 1) the optimization problem for the nonprot organization











Theorem 2 establishes the existence of a unique subgame perfect equilibrium prole of
local strategies in the nonpartisan gotv stage. Note that in the nonpartisan gotv stage, the
optimization problem in equation (5) is isomorphic to the optimization problem faced by
each contestant in an ns-player Tullock game (Tullock 1980). The proof given here extends
13the analysis of the multi-player Tullock game to allow for asymmetric head-start advantages
(i.e., the initial number of voters mjv0
j in each segment j).
As we will show, some nonprot organizations may choose not to engage in any nonpar-
tisan gotv eorts. Without loss of generality, number the segments in nondecreasing order
with respect to the expression mjv0
j: m1v0
1  m2v0
2  :::  mnsv0
ns. Let P denote the set
of indices of the segments in which the nonprots participate in gotv eorts (i.e., optimally
choose strictly positive targets x
j > 0 for gotv eorts), and let k  ns denote the number
of segments in which nonprots choose to participate in gotv eorts. It will also be helpful
























Theorem 2. In the nonpartisan gotv stage of the game with ns-tuples of initial turnout
rates v0 = (v0
1;:::;v0
ns) and segment sizes m = (m0
1;:::;m0
ns) that satisfy Assumption 1,















if j  k
0 if j > k






























Proof. Given the relationship between the nonpartisan gotv stage and the multi-player Tul-
lock game, the following characterization of equilibrium strategies builds upon the charac-
terization of the multi-player Tullock game by Hillman and Riley (1989), Stein (2002), and
Matros (2006).






















for all j. Recall that each nonprot can choose not to participate in nonpartisan gotv
eorts and have a strictly positive payo. It follows from the nonprot organization's payo
function, given in equation (5), that for any (ns   1)-tuple of gotv eorts x j 2 [0;1](ns 1)
the expected payo in each segment j from choosing xj = 1 is strictly less than the payo


















From Assumption 2, c(mj;v0
j) = mj(1   v0





with equation (6) it is clearly suboptimal for any nonprot to set xj = 1, and, thus, the
relevant portion of the strategy space is x 2 [0;1)ns.
At an interior solution the rst-order condition for the nonprot's optimization problem





























3 < 0; (8)
and, thus, the objective function is strictly concave.
Given the strict concavity of the objective function, it is clearly suboptimal for the
nonprot in segment j to set x
j = 0 if there exists an x
j > 0 which solves segment j's
rst-order condition given in equation (7). For each of the k participating nonprots (i.e.,



















Observe that the right-hand side of equation (9) is the same for all j 2 P, and recall from
equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv0
j + mj(1   v0
j)xj. It, therefore, follows from equation (9)
that for each j 2 P the increase in the number of voters mj(1   v0
j)x
j is strictly decreasing
with respect to mjv0
j, and thus for j 2 P, m1(1   v0
1)x
1  :::  mk(1   v0
k)x
k > 0, where
k is the number of participating nonprot organizations. The ns   k non-participating
nonprots (i.e., j = 2 P) are characterized by j > k, x
j = 0, and mjvj(0) = mjv0
j.





























16Recalling the denition of the expression Vk, rearranging equation (10) provides the equilib-



























Recall from equation (1) that mjvj(xj) = mjv0
j +mj(1 v0
j)xj. It follows from equations















if j  k
0 if j > k
(12)
To determine which nonprot organizations choose to participate in nonpartisan gotv eorts
recall that the index k is such that m1(1   v0
1)x
1  :::  mk(1   v0
k)x
k > 0, and x
j = 0,
for j > k. From the rst-order condition given in equation (7), the number of nonprot


























This completes the proof of existence. The proof of uniqueness follows along the lines of
Matros (2006).
Before turning to the formal summary of the nature of the unique equilibrium of the
nonpartisan gotv stage (stated in Propositions 2 and 3 below), it is helpful to examine
17a simple example which illuminates the main features. Consider an electorate with 100
citizens divided among 4 segments. The cost of nonpartisan gotv eorts is assumed to be
xjc(mj;v0
j) = xj(0:013)mj(1 v0
j). For each segment, Table 1 below provides the number of
citizens, the initial voter turnout rate, the unique equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eort, the
expected share of the budget, and the initial share of the voters. The segments are arranged
in ascending order with respect to the number of citizens, with segment 1 having 20 citizens,
segments 2 and 3 having 25 citizens, and segment 3 having 30 citizens. The initial voter
turnout rate is 0:5 in segments 1 and 2 and 0:575 in segments 3 and 4. The number of citizens











1 20 0:500 0:34 0:686 0:232 0:185
2 25 0:500 0:07 0:549 0:232 0:231
3 25 0:575 0 0:575 0:243 0:266
4 30 0:575 0 0:575 0:292 0:318
Table 1: Example
Not all of the segments engage in nonpartisan gotv eorts. From the fourth column
of Table 1 we see that in the unique equilibrium in the nonpartisan gotv stage only the
nonprots in segments 1 and 2 participate in nonpartisan gotv eorts (i.e., x
j > 0 for
j = 1;2). As the condition in Theorem 2 states, nonpartisan gotv eorts only occur in those
segments in which the product of the size mj and the initial voter turnout rate v0
j is below
a threshold. That is, equilibrium nonpartisan gotv eorts only occur in segments that are
suciently small and disenfranchised.
The fth column provides the updated voter turnout rates that the political parties
use in the campaign stage. Note that the initial share of the voters (reported in the last
column of Table 1) provides us with what each segment's expected share of the budget from
18the implemented policy would have been if there had not been a nonpartisan gotv stage.
Therefore, in comparing the last two columns of Table 1 we see how each segment's expected
budget share changes as a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage. In this example, the change
in the voter turnout rate (see columns 3 and 5), as a result of the optimal nonpartisan gotv
eorts, is increasing in the segment's level of disenfranchisement (i.e., the ex ante abstention
rate) and is decreasing in the segment's size. As a result of these changes in the voter turnout
rates the political parties place relatively higher weights on the smaller more disenfranchised
segments. Comparing the last two columns of Table 1, we see that among the segments in
which nonpartisan gotv eorts arise (segments 1 and 2) the change in the expected budget
share is higher in the smaller segment (segment 1). As a result of the nonpartisan gotv stage,
the change in segment 1's expected budget share is equal to .047 (.232 minus .185) while the
change in segment 2's expected budget share is equal to .001 (.232 minus .231). Furthermore,
in each of the segments in which nonpartisian gotv eorts do not arise (segments 3 and 4),
the expected budget shares decrease.
As formally stated in Propositions 2 and 3, among those segments of the electorate that
engage in nonpartisan gotv eorts each segment's increase in the voter turnout rate and the
resulting change in the expected budget share are both strictly decreasing with respect to
the number of citizens in the segment and the initial voter turnout rate in the segment.
Proposition 2. In each of the segments in which the nonprot organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv eorts (i.e., each j 2 P or equivalently j  k), the equilibrium increase in
segment j's voter turnout rate, as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eorts, is strictly decreasing
with respect to both segment j's number of citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v0
j.
From the unique equilibrium target rates fx
jg
ns
j=1 given in Theorem 2, it follows that for



























which is clearly decreasing with respect to both segment j's number of citizens mj and the
initial voter turnout rate v0
j. That is, the largest increases in the turnout rates occur in the
smallest and most disenfranchised segments.
Given the political parties' optimal strategies in the campaign stage (see Theorem 1),
the equilibrium expected budget shares from the implemented policy are increasing with
respect to the voter turnout rates (Proposition 1). Thus, to the extent that nonpartisan
gotv eorts change the expected turnout rates, nonpartisan gotv eorts have an impact on
policy outcomes. As Proposition 2 states, among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv
eorts arise, the increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing with respect to the number
of citizens and the initial voter turnout rate. Combining the results from Propositions 1 and
2, we see that among those segments in which nonpartisan gotv eorts arise the change in
the expected budget share is also decreasing with respect to the number of citizens and the
initial voter turnout rate.
Proposition 3. In each of the segments in which the nonprot organizations participate in
nonpartisan gotv eorts (i.e., each j 2 P or equivalently j  k), the change in segment
j's equilibrium expected share of the budget from the implemented policy, as a result of the
nonpartisan gotv eorts, is strictly decreasing with respect to both segment j's number of
citizens mj and the initial voter turnout rate v0
j.
In each of the segments in which the nonprot organizations do not participate in non-
partisan gotv eorts (i.e., each j = 2 P or equivalently j > k), the equilibrium expected budget
share from the implemented policy decreases as a result of the nonpartisan gotv eorts in the
other segments.
20Given the unique equilibrium expected budget shares, derived in Proposition 1, it follows
that for each segment j 2 P the change in segment j's expected budget share mjE(tjjx)














The rst part of Proposition 3, then, follows from the equilibrium target rates given in






= 1   VK; (17)
and, thus, from (16) the change in the expected budget share mjE(tjjx) is decreasing
with respect to both segment j's number of citizens mj and initial voter turnout rate v0
j.
For the second part of Proposition 3, note that for each j = 2 P the change in segment j's













which is strictly negative if any of the nonprot organizations engage in nonpartisan gotv
eorts.
It is also important to note that just because the nonprot aliated with a segment
participates in gotv eorts, it is not necessarily the case that the segment's change in the
expected budget share is positive. That is, it is possible that among the segments that
participate in gotv eorts one or more of the larger and more engaged segments may have a
lower expected budget share. However, it is still optimal for the nonprots in such segments
to engage in nonpartisan gotv eorts since not doing so would result in even larger losses
from the nonpartisan gotv stage.
214 Conclusion
This paper examines the eects of nonpartisan gotv eorts in a simple multistage game of re-
distributive politics with voter abstention. For each segment of the electorate in equilibrium
the expected transfers from both of the political parties, and hence from the implemented
policy, are increasing with respect to the segment's voter turnout rate. In weighing the costs
and benets of nonpartisan gotv eorts, only the nonprot advocacy groups aliated with
suciently small and disenfranchised segments of the electorate engage in nonpartisan gotv
eorts. In those segments in which the corresponding nonprot engages in gotv eorts, the
equilibrium increase in the voter turnout rate is decreasing in both the size of the segment
and in the initial turnout rate. As a result the smaller more disenfranchised segments gain
the most from nonpartisan gotv eorts. These results on the nature and impact of nonpar-
tisan gotv eorts illustrate that even though the political inuence activities of nonprot
advocacy organizations may be constrained, these activities inuence policy outcomes and
are important tools for nonprot advocacy organizations.
Appendix
This appendix establishes: (a) the existence of joint distributions which satisfy conditions (1)
and (2) of Theorem 1 (i.e., form an equilibrium in the campaign stage of the multistage game
of redistributive politics with targeted nonpartisan gotv eorts), and (b) the uniqueness of
the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given in condition (2) of Theorem
1. The formal proof of the existence of strategies which satisfy conditions (1) and (2) of
Theorem 1 follows lines drawn by Laslier (2002). In this appendix, we only show how the
subgame in the campaign stage is isomorphic to the game in that paper.
As mentioned in the description of the model, the subgame in the campaign stage extends
Laslier (2002) by allowing for voter abstention. In the case that in each segment the expected
22turnout rate (either initially or after the nonpartisan gotv stage) is 1, the two games are
equivalent.9 In the discussion that follows we show that the equilibria in these two games are
related even when the expected turnout rates are not all equal to 1. Recall that within each
segment, each party must promise the same transfer to each citizen. Thus, if the equilibrium
citizen-level randomization for segment j, given in Theorem 1, is
8 j 2 f1;:::;nsg F 
i;j (t) = t
2vj=
Pns







then since there are mj citizens in segment j the segment-level randomization is given by
8 j 2 f1;:::;nsg F s
i;j (t) = t
2vjmj=
Pns







Letting ^ mj  mjvj(xj), the set of segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions
given in equation (19) is identical to that arising in Laslier (2002) and the joint distribution
construction given in Lemmas 4-7 of that paper applies directly. Therefore, each party has a
strategy that satises the restriction on the support given in condition (1) of Theorem 1 |
which implies directly that budget-balancing occurs with probability one | and that provides
the set of univariate marginal distribution functions stated in condition (2) of Theorem 1.
We now address the the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distri-
butions given in condition (2) of Theorem 1. The formal proof of this uniqueness follows
lines drawn by Roberson (2006). The uniqueness of the equilibrium univariate marginal
distributions in the campaign stage follow from the relationship between the subgame in
the campaign stage and Roberson (2006). In the discussion that follows we will focus on
the segment-level univariate marginal distributions functions given in equation (19). Recall
that ^ mj  mjvj(xj). Roberson (2006) examines both the symmetric and asymmetric Colonel
Blotto game with homogeneous battleelds and provides a characterization of the equilibrium
9Note that in that paper the budget is set to Q, while in this paper the budget has been normalized to 1.
23sets of univariate marginal distributions for a range of parameter congurations. By focusing
on the segment-level univariate marginal distribution functions and setting ^ mj  mjvj(xj),
the subgame in the campaign stage is equivalent to a symmetric Colonel Blotto game with
heterogenous battleelds (i.e., segments of the electorate). In the case of symmetric resources,
the proof of the uniqueness of the equilibrium sets of univariate marginal distributions given
in Roberson (2006) extends directly to allow for heterogenous battleelds.
References
[1] Austen-Smith, D. (1987). Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic
voting. Public Choice, 54, 123-139.
[2] Baron, D. (1992). Electoral competition with informed and uniniformed voters. Ameri-
can Political Science Review, 88, 33-47.
[3] Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2001). Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy.
Review of Economic Studies, 68, 67-82.
[4] Converse, P. E. (1966). The concept of the normal vote. In A. Campbell, P. E. Converse,
W. E. Miller, & D. E. Stokes (Eds.), Elections and the Political Order, (p. 24). Hoboken,
New Jersey: Wiley.
[5] Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game.
Journal of Politics, 48, 370-389.
[6] Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1995). Redistributive politics and economic eciency. Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 89, 856-866.
[7] Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in
redistributive politics. Journal of Politics, 58, 1132-1155.
24[8] Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy, (p. 39, 260-276). New York:
Harper and Row.
[9] Green, D. P., & Gerber, A. S. (2008). Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout,
Second Edition. Baltimore, Maryland: Brookings Institution Press.
[10] Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (1996). Electoral competition and special interest politics.
Review of Economic Studies, 63, 265-286.
[11] Grossman, G., & Helpman, E. (2001). Special Interest Politics, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: M.I.T. press.
[12] Hillman, A., & Riley, J. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics
and Politics, 1, 17-39.
[13] Hinich, M. J., & Ordeshook, P. (1969). Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral
process. Public Choice, 7, 81-106.
[14] Kovenock, D., & Roberson, B. (2008). Electoral poaching and party identication. Jour-
nal of Theoretical Politics, 20, 275-302.
[15] Kovenock, D., & Roberson, B. (2009). Inecient redistribution and inecient redis-
tributive politics. Public Choice, 139, 263-272.
[16] Laslier, J. F. (2002). How two-party competition treats minorities. Review of Economic
Design, 7, 297-307.
[17] Laslier, J. F., & Picard, N. (2002). Distributive politics and electoral competition. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 103, 106-130.
[18] Ledyard, J. O. (1984). The pure theory of large two-candidate elections. Public Choice,
44, 7-41.
25[19] Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of
political competition. Public Choice, 52, 272-297.
[20] Marwell, N. P. (2004). Privatizing the welfare state: nonprot community-based orga-
nizations as political actors. American Sociological Review, 69, 265-291.
[21] Matros, A. (2006). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: addition or deletion of a
player. Public Choice, 129, 369-380.
[22] Riker, W. H., and P. C. Ordeshook (1973), An Introduction to Positive Political Theory,
Upper Sadle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
[23] Roberson, B. (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory, 29, 1-24.
[24] Roberson, B. (2008). Pork-barrel politics, targetable policies, and scal federalism. Jour-
nal of the European Economic Association, 6, 819-844.
[25] Schultz, C. (2007). Strategic campaigns and redistributive politics. Economic Journal,
117, 936-963.
[26] Stein, W. (2002). Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants. Public
Choice, 113, 325-336.
[27] Str omberg, D. (2004). Mass media competition, political competition, and public policy.
Review of Economic Studies, 71, 265-284.
[28] Tullock, G. (1980), Ecient rent seeking. In J. M. Buchanan, R. D. Tollison, & G. Tul-
lock (Eds.), Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, (pp 97-112) 95-124. College
Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.
26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2753 Daniel G. Arce, Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Suicide Terrorism and the 
Weakest Link, August 2009 
 
2754 Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Comparative Advantage and Skill-Specific 
Unemployment, August 2009 
 
2755 Horst Raff and Nicolas Schmitt, Buyer Power in International Markets, August 2009 
 
2756 Seppo Kari, Hanna Karikallio and Jukka Pirttilä, The Impact of Dividend Taxation on 
Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment, August 2009 
 
2757 Mirco Tonin and Michael Vlassopoulos, Disentangling the Sources of Pro-social 
Behavior in the Workplace: A Field Experiment, August 2009 
 
2758 Nicole Grunewald and Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Driving Factors of Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions and the Impact from Kyoto Protocol, August 2009 
 
2759 Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Booms, Recessions and Financial Turmoil: A Fresh 
Look at Investment Decisions under Cyclical Uncertainty, August 2009 
 
2760 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Jakob de Haan, Does Central Bank Communication really Lead 
to better Forecasts of Policy Decisions? New Evidence Based on a Taylor Rule Model 
for the ECB, August 2009 
 
2761 Larry Karp, Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions, August 2009 
 
2762 Marianna Belloc and Samuel Bowles, International Trade, Factor Mobility and the 
Persistence of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, August 2009 
 
2763 Charles Noussair and Fangfang Tan, Voting on Punishment Systems within a 
Heterogeneous Group, August 2009 
 
2764 Birgit Bednar-Friedl and Karl Farmer, Internationally Coordinated Emission Permit 
Policies: An Option for Withdrawers from the Kyoto Protocol?, August 2009 
 
2765 Pierre M. Picard and David E. Wildasin, Labor Market Pooling, Outsourcing and Labor 
Contracts, August 2009 
 
2766 Stefan Voigt and Lorenz Blume, The Economic Effects of Federalism and 
Decentralization – A Cross-Country Assessment, August 2009 
 
2767 David S. Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner and Dennis Novy, Trade Booms, Trade Busts, 
and Trade Costs, August 2009 
 
  
2768 Mario Jametti and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Hurricane Insurance in Florida, 
August 2009 
 
2769 Alessandro Balestrino, Kind of Black: The Musicians’ Labour Market in Italy, August 
2009 
 
2770 Yosr Abid Fourati and Cathal O’Donoghue, Eliciting Individual Preferences for Pension 
Reform, August 2009 
 
2771 Christian Breuer and Chang Woon Nam, VAT on Intra-Community Trade and Bilateral 
Micro Revenue Clearing in the EU, August 2009 
 
2772 Choudhry Tanveer Shehzad, Jakob De Haan and Bert Scholtens, Growth and Earnings 
Persistence in Banking Firms: A Dynamic Panel Investigation, August 2009 
 
2773 Erdal Yalcin, Uncertain Productivity Growth and the Choice between FDI and Export, 
August 2009 
 
2774 Klaus Abberger, Wolfgang Nierhaus and Shynar Shaikh, Findings of the Signal 
Approach for Financial Monitoring in Kazakhstan, September 2009 
 
2775 Sascha O. Becker, Francesco Cinnirella and Ludger Woessmann, The Trade-off 
between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition, 
September 2009 
 
2776 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Income Taxation, Outsourcing and 
Policy Cooperation in a Dynamic Economy, September 2009 
 
2777 Joel Slemrod, Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax 
Economics, September 2009 
 
2778 Cagri Seda Kumru and Athanasios C. Thanopoulos, Social Security Reform and 
Temptation, September 2009 
 
2779 Alessandro Bucciol and Roel M. W. J. Beetsma, Inter- and Intra-generational 
Consequences of Pension Buffer Policy under Demographic, Financial and Economic 
Shocks, September 2009 
 
2780 Eduardo Strube and Marcelo Resende, Complementarity of Innovation Policies in the 
Brazilian Industry: An Econometric Study, September 2009 
 
2781 Henry Tulkens and Vincent van Steenberghe, “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In 
Search of the Right Mix in the Face of Climate Change, September 2009 
 
2782 Maria L. Loureiro, Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano and Daniela Vuri, Smoking Habits: Like 
Father, Like Son, Like Mother, Like Daughter, September 2009 
 
2783 Momi Dahan, Tehila Kogut and Moshe Shalem, Do Economic Policymakers Practice 
what they Preach? The Case of Pension Decisions, September 2009 
  
2784 Eytan Sheshinski, Uncertain Longevity and Investment in Education, September 2009 
 
2785 Nannette Lindenberg and Frank Westermann, How Strong is the Case for Dollarization 
in Costa Rica? A Note on the Business Cycle Comovements with the United States, 
September 2009 
 
2786 Leif Danziger, Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on Hours and 
Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets, September 2009 
 
2787 Gerlinde Fellner, Rupert Sausgruber and Christian Traxler, Testing Enforcement 
Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information, September 
2009 
 
2788 Gabriel J. Felbermayr, Mario Larch and Wolfgang Lechthaler, Unemployment in an 
Interdependent World, September 2009 
 
2789 Sebastian G. Kessing, Federalism and Accountability with Distorted Election Choices, 
September 2009 
 
2790 Daniel Gros, Global Welfare Implications of Carbon Border Taxes, September 2009 
 
2791 Louis N. Christofides, Michael Hoy and Ling Yang, The Gender Imbalance in 
Participation in Canadian Universities (1977-2005), September 2009 
 
2792 Jan K. Brueckner and Robert W. Helsley, Sprawl and Blight, September 2009 
 
2793 Vidar Christiansen and Stephen Smith, Externality-correcting Taxes and Regulation, 
September 2009 
 
2794 John Beirne, Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Marianne Schulze-Ghattas and Nicola 
Spagnolo, Global and Regional Spillovers in Emerging Stock Markets: A Multivariate 
GARCH-in-mean Analysis, September 2009 
 
2795 Rüdiger Pethig and Frieder Kolleß, Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition, 
Unemployment and Losses from Capital Market Integration, September 2009 
 
2796 Ngo Van Long, Horst Raff and Frank Stähler, Innovation and Trade with 
Heterogeneous Firms, September 2009 
 
2797 Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey, Research Governance in Academia: Are there 
Alternatives to Academic Rankings?, September 2009 
 
2798 Thiess Buettner and Clemens Fuest, The Role of the Corporate Income Tax as an 
Automatic Stabilizer, September 2009 
 
2799 Annette Alstadsæter, Measuring the Consumption Value of Higher Education, 
September 2009 
 
2800 Peter Friedrich, Chang Woon Nam and Janno Reiljan, Local Fiscal Equalization in 
Estonia: Is a Reform Necessary?, September 2009  
2801 Evžen Kočenda and Jan Hanousek, State Ownership and Control in the Czech Republic, 
September 2009 
 
2802 Michael Stimmelmayr, Wage Inequality in Germany: Disentangling Demand and 
Supply Effects, September 2009 
 
2803 Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Towards a Macroprudential Surveillance and Remedial Policy 
Formulation System for Monitoring Financial Crisis, September 2009 
 
2804 Margarita Katsimi, Sarantis Kalyvitis and Thomas Moutos, “Unwarranted” Wage 
Changes and the Return on Capital, September 2009 
 
2805 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, Aid, Growth and Devolution, September 
2009 
 
2806 Bas Jacobs and Dirk Schindler, On the Desirability of Taxing Capital Income to Reduce 
Moral Hazard in Social Insurance, September 2009 
 
2807 Hans Gersbach and Noemi Hummel, Climate Policy and Development, September 2009 
 
2808 David E. Wildasin, Fiscal Competition for Imperfectly-Mobile Labor and Capital: A 
Comparative Dynamic Analysis, September 2009 
 
2809 Johan Eyckmans and Cathrine Hagem, The European Union’s Potential for Strategic 
Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts, September 2009 
 
2810 Ruediger Bachmann and Christian Bayer, The Cross-section of Firms over the Business 
Cycle: New Facts and a DSGE Exploration, October 2009 
 
2811 Slobodan Djajić and Michael S. Michael, Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of 
the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach, October 2009 
 
2812 Devis Geron, Social Security Incidence under Uncertainty Assessing Italian Reforms, 
October 2009 
 
2813 Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Economic Nationalism and Economic 
Integration: The Austro-Hungarian Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century, October 
2009 
 
2814 Emilia Simeonova, Out of Sight, Out of Mind? The Impact of Natural Disasters on 
Pregnancy Outcomes, October 2009 
 
2815 Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Non-Partisan ‘Get-Out-the-Vote’ Efforts and 
Policy Outcomes, October 2009 